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## “MEANING” VA “ICHKI MA’NO”NING EKZISTENSIAL KONSEPT SIFATIDAGI NAZARIY-QIYOSIY TAHLILI

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### Annotatsiya

Maqolada zamonaviy motivatsion diskursdagi inglizchadagi **meaning** va o‘zbekchadagi **ichki ma’no** ekzistensial konseptlari nazariy-qiyosiy yondashuvda muhokama qilinadi. Leksik tipologiya, freym semantikasi va pragmatik nazariyaga tayanib, har bir tilning ekzistensial leksikasini tashkil etuvchi konseptual triadalar aniqlanadi: ingliz tilida *why – purpose – calling*, o‘zbek tilida *maqсад – niyat – mas’uliyat*. Ikki triada o‘rtasidagi tipologik farqlar, ayniqsa o‘zbek tilidagi relyatsion **kim uchun** o‘lchovi tavsiflanadi hamda til orasi tarjima, madaniyatlararo muloqot va motivatsion diskursning nazariy tipologiyasi uchun oqibatlarini muhokama qilinadi.

**Kalit so‘zlar:** **meaning; ichki ma’no;** ekzistensial konsept; konseptual triada; leksik tipologiya; qiyosiy pragmatika.

## ТЕОРЕТИКО-СОПОСТАВИТЕЛЬНОЕ ОБСУЖДЕНИЕ ПОНЯТИЙ «MEANING» И «ИЧКИ МА’НО» КАК ЭКЗИСТЕНЦИАЛЬНЫХ КОНЦЕПТОВ

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### Аннотация

В статье представлен теоретико-сопоставительный анализ экзистенциальных концептов **meaning** в английском и **ichki ma’no** в узбекском языке в современном мотивационном дискурсе. На основе лексической типологии, фрейм-семантики и прагматической теории выявляются концептуальные триады, организующие экзистенциальную лексику каждого языка: *why–purpose–calling* в английском и *maqсад–niyat–mas’uliyat* в узбекском. Характеризуются типологические различия двух триад, в частности наличие реляционного измерения «**для кого**» в узбекском; обсуждаются последствия для межъязыкового перевода, межкультурной коммуникации и теоретической типологии мотивационного дискурса.

**Ключевые слова:** **meaning; ichki ma’no;** экзистенциальный концепт; концептуальная триада; лексическая типология; сопоставительная прагматика.

## “MEANING” AND “ICHKI MA’NO” AS EXISTENTIAL CONCEPTS: A THEORETICAL – COMPARATIVE DISCUSSION

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### Abstract

This article offers a theoretical-comparative discussion of the existential concepts **meaning** in English and **ichki ma’no** in Uzbek motivational discourse. Drawing on lexical typology, frame semantics, and pragmatic theory, the article identifies the conceptual triads that organize each language’s existential vocabulary: *why–purpose–calling* in English and *maqсад–niyat–mas’uliyat* in Uzbek. The article characterizes the typological differences between the two triads, particularly the presence of a relational **for-whom** dimension in Uzbek, and discusses the consequences for cross-linguistic translation, intercultural communication, and the theoretical typology of motivational discourse.

**Keywords:** **meaning; ichki ma’no;** existential concept; conceptual triad; lexical typology; comparative pragmatics.

The question of what makes a human life meaningful has been a recurring concern of motivational writing at least since Frankl articulated logotherapy in the aftermath of the Second World War [Frankl, 2006, p. 12]. Within the contemporary motivational genre in English, a recognizable vocabulary — *why, purpose, calling* — has gradually settled around an individual agent moving toward a self-defined aim. The Uzbek vocabulary for the same domain — *maqсад, niyat, mas’uliyat, mazmun, intilish* — looks superficially parallel, yet, on closer inspection, is organized by a different schema [Xudoyberganova, 2013,

p. 45].

Despite the centrality of the topic, a coordinated cross-linguistic account of meaning and *ichki ma'no* has not been developed in the comparative-pragmatic literature. The present article takes a step in that direction. Three questions structure the discussion. What does the meaning field look like in contemporary English motivational discourse? What does the *ichki ma'no* field look like in contemporary Uzbek motivational discourse? And what typological difference, if any, distinguishes the two fields once their internal structure is set out side by side?

The argument advanced here is that the two fields are organized around different conceptual triads — *why–purpose–calling* in English, *maqsad–niyat–mas'uliyat* in Uzbek — and that the principal contrast between them is the presence, in Uzbek, of a relational “for-whom” dimension that English encodes only implicitly. The analysis is qualitative and theoretical-typological; the quantitative testing of the model is reserved for a later stage of the broader doctoral project.

A subsidiary aim is to make contact with the broader debate over the universality of existential vocabulary. The basic human concern with what one's life is for is plausibly universal; the conceptual resources with which any particular language addresses that concern are not. The cross-linguistic gap traced in the present article is one small piece of evidence for the second half of that claim.

## 2. Theoretical Framework and Analytical Approach

The discussion combines three theoretical frameworks: frame semantics [Fillmore, 1982, pp. 111–137], speech-act theory [Searle, 1969, pp. 22–53], and the Natural Semantic Metalanguage tradition within lexical typology [Wierzbicka, 1999, pp. 24–35], and applies them to five passages drawn from widely circulated works of contemporary motivational and scholarly writing. Frankl writes that “he who has a why to live for can bear almost any how” [Frankl, 2006, p. 84], anchoring existential endurance in a future-oriented interrogative that presupposes an individual agent. Sinek contends that “people don't buy what you do; they buy why you do it” [Sinek, 2009, p. 41], elevating the same *why*-question from biographical reflection to the organizing principle of professional action. Covey instructs the reader to “begin with the end in mind” by mentally projecting to her own funeral [Covey, 2004, p. 96], thereby completing the prospective-individual profile that holds the English triad together. Safarov, by contrast, characterizes *niyat* as the inner motivating force behind any utterance with existential weight [Safarov, 2008, p. 142], situating Uzbek meaning-discourse in the speaker's present moral stance rather than in a prospective aim. Xudoyberganova analyses *mas'uliyat* as a relational textual anchor that binds the textual subject to other subjects within the discourse [Xudoyberganova, 2013, p. 78], introducing the for-whom dimension that the English triad does not encode. Each passage was analysed at three coordinated levels: lexical preference, frame-semantic slot structure, and pragmatic illocutionary alignment, and the resulting profiles were then collated across the two language traditions to derive the typological model presented in Section 3.

## 3. Linguistic analysis of the four illustrative passages

The five passages identified in Section 2 admit a coordinated analysis along the three dimensions established there. The aim of this sub-section is to make the typological contrast concrete by showing how each passage participates in one of the two profiles. In order to demonstrate this contrast more systematically, the analysis proceeds passage by passage, examining lexical organization, frame-semantic structure, temporal orientation, and pragmatic alignment. Such an approach allows the existential vocabulary of English and Uzbek motivational discourse to be compared not merely at the level of dictionary equivalence, but at the deeper level of conceptual architecture and communicative function.

### Passage 1. Frankl: the *why* as future-oriented interrogative anchor

Viktor Frankl's sentence — “he who has a ‘why’ to live for can bear almost any ‘how’” [Frankl, 2006, p. 84] — distributes its semantic content across several interconnected linguistic elements: an interrogative lexeme (*why*), a generic individual subject (*he who*), and a modal construction of endurance (*can bear*). Even though the sentence appears syntactically simple, its conceptual organization is highly structured. The frame-semantic slots may be represented as follows: subject = generic individual; object-of-meaning = unspecified existential aim; action = endurance under suffering; temporal horizon = open-ended future orientation.

A particularly important feature of this construction is the role of the interrogative lexeme *why*. Grammatically, *why* belongs to the class of interrogative adverbs; pragmatically, however, it functions not as a direct question but as an existential anchor. The sentence does not ask the reader explicitly, “What is your why?” Instead, the reader is indirectly invited to occupy the position of the generalized subject.

Through this indirect interrogative structure, the statement acquires reflective force. The addressee is led to internalize the existential problem and apply it to herself.

At the pragmatic level, the utterance therefore functions as a reflective-interrogative act. It encourages self-examination and existential introspection rather than immediate action. The modal verb *can bear* further reinforces the future-oriented orientation of the frame because endurance presupposes continuity through time. Meaning is not represented as static possession but as a sustaining force enabling the individual to survive future hardship.

Another important characteristic of Frankl's formulation is the centrality of the autonomous individual subject. The sentence presupposes that meaning originates internally within the individual agent and subsequently shapes his or her relationship to suffering. This orientation corresponds closely to the broader structure of English motivational discourse, in which existential meaning is often conceptualized as personal direction, self-definition, and future-oriented agency.

From the perspective of lexical typology, the English lexeme *why* differs significantly from Uzbek existential vocabulary such as *maqsad* or *niyat*. Whereas *why* foregrounds existential justification and causation, Uzbek equivalents tend to encode intention, moral orientation, or relational obligation more directly. Thus, even at the level of a single lexeme, the English existential model already reveals a strongly individual-prospective structure.

### **Passage 2. Sinek: the *why* as organizing principle of action**

Simon Sinek's thesis — "people don't buy what you do; they buy why you do it" [Sinek, 2009, p. 41] — preserves the same lexical centerpiece (*why*) but reorganizes its semantic and pragmatic frame. Whereas Frankl situates *why* within existential endurance, Sinek relocates it into the sphere of professional and organizational communication.

The frame slots in this passage may be represented as follows: subject = generic plural (*people*); action = transactional process (*buy*); object-of-meaning = motivational principle underlying action; communicative horizon = social-professional interaction. The lexical core remains unchanged, yet its communicative function is transformed.

Unlike Frankl's reflective mode, Sinek's utterance operates within a demonstrative-practical frame. The statement functions as strategic advice directed toward entrepreneurs, leaders, and organizations. The illocutionary alignment therefore shifts from reflective-interrogative to demonstrative-imperative. Although grammatically declarative, the sentence implicitly communicates the directive: "make your why visible," or "organize your activity around clearly articulated motivation."

The semantic significance of this passage lies in the externalization of meaning. Frankl's *why* is primarily internal and existential; Sinek's *why* becomes socially communicable and economically functional. Meaning is no longer solely a source of endurance but also a persuasive mechanism through which individuals influence others.

Nevertheless, despite this pragmatic shift, the conceptual structure remains fundamentally individual-prospective. The motivational center still originates within the autonomous subject and radiates outward toward future achievement and social recognition. The future horizon remains dominant because the entire communicative model is organized around goals, influence, organizational success, and projected outcomes.

At the lexical level, the persistence of *why* across distinct communicative domains demonstrates the stability of the English motivational schema. Whether existential (Frankl) or professional (Sinek), the discourse consistently organizes meaning around internally generated motivation projected toward future realization.

### **Passage 3. Covey: the prospective horizon as evaluative standpoint**

Stephen Covey's directive — "begin with the end in mind" [Covey, 2004, p. 96] — represents the most procedurally explicit formulation among the English passages examined in this article. Unlike Frankl's reflective aphorism or Sinek's communicative principle, Covey offers a concrete existential method. Its frame-semantic structure may be represented as follows: subject = second-person addressee (*you*, implicit); action = directive-imperative (*begin*); object-of-meaning = terminal life objective ("the end"); temporal horizon = total-life future projection. The utterance explicitly instructs the addressee to organize present action through imagined retrospection from the future. The phrase *the end* occupies a particularly important semantic position in the construction. It functions not merely as chronological termination but as evaluative culmination. The individual is asked to imagine a completed life viewed retrospectively from its endpoint. In this way, future projection becomes the primary mechanism through

which present meaning is constructed. Pragmatically, the utterance functions as a directive speech act. Unlike Frankl's invitation to existential reflection or Sinek's persuasive organizational principle, Covey's sentence directly instructs behavioural orientation. The addressee is encouraged to project herself imaginatively into a future evaluative standpoint and then structure current life accordingly. This passage consolidates the prospective-individual orientation already visible in Frankl and Sinek. Frankl asks the reader to discover her *why*; Sinek asks her to communicate that *why* socially; Covey asks her to operationalize future-oriented meaning as a life-management technique. Thus, the English existential triad gradually evolves from reflection to communication to procedural implementation. At the level of conceptual structure, the individual subject remains central throughout. Meaning continues to emerge from autonomous self-definition directed toward future achievement, coherence, and fulfillment. The relational dimension remains secondary and largely implicit.

**Passage 4. Xudoyberganova: *mas'uliyat* as the relational anchor**

Dilfuza Xudoyberganova's interpretation of *mas'uliyat* as a relational textual category [Xudoyberganova, 2013, p. 78] introduces precisely the structural component absent from the English motivational triad. Whereas *why* may function independently within an individual semantic frame, *mas'uliyat* is structurally relational from the outset. The frame-semantic organization of *mas'uliyat* necessarily includes at least two participants: subject = bearer of obligation; recipient = relational target (*for-whom* dimension). In many cases, additional contextual slots may also emerge, such as family, community, nation, or moral authority. Consequently, the Uzbek existential model distributes meaning across a network of interpersonal relations rather than locating it exclusively within the autonomous self. This distinction is crucial. In the English passages, meaning is fundamentally self-organized and future-directed. In Xudoyberganova's analysis, however, existential significance depends upon relational accountability. Meaning is evaluated not solely according to personal aspiration or motivational coherence, but according to how effectively obligations toward others are fulfilled. The pragmatic alignment of *mas'uliyat* is therefore evaluative-relational. The speaker's moral position is assessed through relational conduct. One's existential worth emerges through responsibility toward parents, family, community, society, or collective moral order. The additional frame slot — *for-whom* — radically alters the architecture of existential discourse. Unlike the English model, where future projection dominates semantic organization, the Uzbek model often combines present moral evaluation with retrospective ethical accountability. Meaning is not only something toward which one moves, but also something demonstrated continuously through socially embedded conduct.

**Passage 5. Safarov: *niyat* as internal moral orientation**

Shavkat Safarov's characterization of *niyat* as the inner motivating force behind existentially significant utterance [Safarov, 2008, p. 142] further develops the Uzbek conceptual profile. Whereas the English *why* primarily encodes existential purpose, *niyat* simultaneously encodes intention, moral orientation, sincerity, and ethical positioning. The frame-semantic structure of *niyat* differs substantially from that of *why*. The central slots may be represented as follows: subject = morally situated speaker; intention = internally held purpose; evaluative dimension = sincerity and ethical legitimacy; temporal horizon = present-oriented with retrospective moral implications. Unlike *why*, which directs attention toward future realization, *niyat* directs attention toward the moral quality of present intentionality. The existential question becomes not only "What are you moving toward?" but also "With what moral intention are you acting now?" This distinction shifts existential discourse from future-oriented self-projection toward ethical evaluation of present consciousness. Pragmatically, *niyat* operates within an evaluative-ethical framework. The sincerity of intention matters as much as the external action itself. Consequently, existential meaning becomes inseparable from moral authenticity. This feature reinforces the relational-evaluative structure already identified through *mas'uliyat*. Taken together, the Uzbek passages therefore reveal a coordinated conceptual profile organized around relational embeddedness, ethical intentionality, and communal accountability. The existential subject is not imagined as fully autonomous but as socially situated and morally interconnected.

**Typological contrast between the two profiles**

Taken together, the three English passages share a coordinated profile characterized by:

- autonomous individual subjectivity;
- prospective temporal orientation;
- future-directed self-realization;
- *why* as the organizing existential lexeme;

- internally generated motivational coherence.  
By contrast, the two Uzbek passages share a different coordinated profile characterized by:
- relationally embedded subjectivity;
- present-and-retrospective moral orientation;
- ethical accountability toward others;
- *niyat* and *mas'uliyat* as organizing existential lexemes;
- communal and evaluative meaning construction.

The typological distinction between the two traditions is therefore supported consistently across all examined dimensions:

1. lexical organization;
2. frame-semantic slot structure;
3. temporal orientation;
4. pragmatic alignment;
5. relational inventory.

English motivational discourse conceptualizes existential meaning primarily through future-oriented self-definition and autonomous projection. Uzbek motivational discourse conceptualizes existential meaning primarily through moral intention, relational accountability, and socially embedded ethical responsibility.

**Conclusion.** The present article has articulated a theoretical-comparative model for analysing the existential concepts *meaning* in English and *ichki ma'no* in Uzbek motivational discourse. Two distinct conceptual triads were identified — *why-purpose-calling* and *maqsad-niyat-mas'uliyat* — each characterized by a different schematic structure, temporal orientation, and pragmatic organization. Five passages drawn from contemporary motivational and scholarly writing — Frankl, Sinek, Covey, Safarov, and Xudoyberganova — were analysed at lexical, frame-semantic, and pragmatic levels. The resulting profiles support a consistent typological distinction between an individual-prospective orientation and a relational-evaluative orientation. The proposed model clarifies the conceptual asymmetry hidden behind the apparent lexical equivalence *meaning* ↔ *ma'no*. More importantly, it demonstrates that existential vocabulary cannot be understood adequately through dictionary substitution alone. Each language organizes existential experience through culturally embedded conceptual structures that shape agency, morality, temporality, and interpersonal relations differently.

Methodologically, the article also proposes a transferable analytical framework combining:

- lexical preference analysis;
- frame-semantic slot structure;
- pragmatic illocutionary alignment;
- relational slot inventory.

Such a framework may be extended to other existential vocabularies and additional language pairs in future cross-linguistic research. Future stages of the broader doctoral project will expand the corpus considerably and subject the present theoretical model to systematic empirical verification through quantitative discourse analysis, corpus-based lexical distribution studies, and comparative pragmatic testing.

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